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We analyze an interdiction problem in which a nuclear-material smuggler can 
traverse multiple transportation networks, wherein each edge has an indigenous 
probability of evasion. Our objective is to determine the optimal locations of a limited 
number of radiation detectors at United States ports of entry across multiple networks 
(maritime, road and rail) so as to minimize the smuggler's total probability of evasion, 
from origin to destination. We choose geographically diverse potential origins and give 
the smuggler freedom to move across and between transportation networks. Further, we 
consider two different models of smuggler behavior in this context. Our analysis aims to 
provide a complete prioritization and picture of the threat at all ports of entry, leading to 
insight into good practical locations for detectors. 
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1. Introduction and motivation 
Nuclear weapons pose a serious threat to the safety and security of the United 
States and its people. The dissolution of the Soviet Union resulted in a lot of excess 
nuclear material, intended for the manufacture of nuclear weapons, to be left in unsecured 
or vulnerable locations. Even nuclear material not enriched to weapons-grade levels can 
be combined with conventional explosives to make a so-called “dirty bomb”, which uses 
the explosives to disperse the radioactive plutonium or uranium. Other radioactive 
material can also be used in a dirty bomb. These weapons have the potential to cause 
catastrophic damage on a wide scale, especially if detonated in a densely populated area. 
Therefore, the risk of such materials getting into the United States is a serious concern for 
the Department of Homeland Security and other law enforcement agencies. This article is 
concerned with mitigating the risk posed by smugglers attempting to introduce 
potentially dangerous nuclear materials into the country. To reduce the risk of a smuggler 
reaching their target in the United States, we install detectors sensitive to nuclear material 
at ports of entry into the country. We assume that detectors can only be placed at border 
ports of entry. The finite number of U.S. ports of entry limits the number of potential 
routes into the United States, thus creating useful security bottlenecks for screening 
incoming traffic. By placing detectors at ports of entry we take advantage of these 
existing bottlenecks and ensure that all incoming traffic is screened if detectors are 
installed at all ports of entry. Furthermore, we achieve this with fewer resources than it 
would take to do so by encircling every potential target in the United States with 
detectors, for example. Since simultaneously upgrading security at all ports of entry is 
prohibitively expensive, we need to know how to best allocate limited numbers of 
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radiation detectors so as to minimize the probability of a smuggler successfully bringing 
dangerous nuclear materials into the U.S. 
The problem of how to best interdict smugglers and protect the United States 
from such a threat is broad, and the problem allows for a variety of potential approaches 
and areas of research. Although much thought and resources have been put toward 
developing more sophisticated and reliable radiation detectors, the problem of where to 
allocate and install these detectors so as to minimize threat remains relatively unexplored. 
The goal of this article is to give some insight into and answers to this facet of the nuclear 
materials smuggler problem. 
  
 3
2. Literature review 
Network interdiction models have been studied extensively in the past. In one of 
the earliest references, Fulkerson and Harding [5] discuss the problem of maximizing an 
adversary’s shortest path. Reed [13] and Brown et al. [2] examine the problem of 
maximizing the longest path in the Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT) 
network of an adversary, thereby maximizing the time to project completion. In the 
continuous case, this is done by lengthening an arc and thus increasing the length of the 
adversary’s preferred path. In the discrete version, maximizing the shortest path involves 
removing an interdicted arc from the network, or discretely lengthening it, thereby 
forcing the adversary to change their path selection. In both cases, the interdictor faces a 
budget constraint, representing available resources. In the case where that budget 
constraint is one of cardinality (i.e., the interdictor can remove at most k arcs from the 
network), the problem is known as the k-most-vital-arcs problem. This is presented by 
Corley and Sha [3] and Malik et al. [7]. All of these articles present deterministic models 
of network interdiction, where arc lengths are known with certainty, as the effects of 
removing or lengthening an arc. Stochastic network interdiction models have been 





The problem in question is a stochastic network interdiction model. We are 
dealing with an intelligent, informed smuggler who travels over a given transportation 
network, choosing the path from origin to destination which maximizes his evasion 
probability. Prior to the smuggler selecting this path, the interdictor installs radiation 
detectors to minimize the smuggler’s evasion probability. Since we limit potential 
detector locations to ports of entry into the United States, with all origins outside the 
border and all destinations within the country, the model is defined on a bipartite 
network. The problem is stochastic in nature because the interdictor only knows the 
smuggler’s origin and destination through a probability distribution. 
3.1. MODEL FORMULATION 
Ours is a special case of a basic interdiction model, which is described below. 
3.1.1. Interdiction model 
 k∈ K ports of entry 
 ω ∈ Ω smuggler type 
 Pω  probability of threat scenario ω 
 ck  cost of installing a detector at k 
 b  installation budget 







∈ 0,1 , ∈  
where h(x, ω) is the evasion probability for smuggler ω. 
For every budget value b, the objective function of this model has us selecting the 
set of ports of entry at which to install detectors (k for which xk = 1) such that we 
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minimize the sum of the evasion probabilities h(x, ω) for all smugglers ω ∈ Ω (defined by 
an origin-destination pair), each weighted by the probability of seeing such a smuggler, 
denoted by Pω. This is done subject to the constraint that the total cost of installing all 
detectors (the sum of costs ck over all k for which xk = 1) is less than or equal to the 
budget value b. In our model we assume that the cost ck of installing a detector at port of 
entry (POE) k is equal for all k ∈ K, transforming the budget constraint into a cardinality 
constraint. The evasion probabilities h(x, ω) are discussed in more detail below. 
3.1.2. Evasive and volume smugglers 
We consider two basic strategies that smugglers might adopt in their efforts to 
cross the border undetected. The first of these is given by the evasive smuggler 
(developed in Morton et al. [8]). This smuggler represents the worst-case smuggler 
behavior from the interdictor’s point of view. Evasive smugglers have perfect 
information on detector locations and the evasion probabilities of every path they could 
take. They optimize over all possible paths from origin to destination, picking the one 
that maximizes their evasion probability. 
The competing strategy is that of the volume smuggler. This smuggler adopts a 
“needle in haystack” approach to getting through the border; they believe they are most 
likely to go by undetected through the POE that sees the most traffic. For the volume 
smuggler, the probability of selecting any POE is directly proportional to the volume of 
traffic that goes through that port. Thus the best strategy for thwarting the volume 
smuggler is to screen as much of the traffic coming into the country as possible. 
One way to approach both of these threats is to express them as separate objective 
functions. In the case of the evasive smuggler, the objective is to minimize the 
smuggler’s maximum evasion probability; that is to say, we need to make the best 
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possible path this smuggler can take as unfavorable for the smuggler as possible. With 
the volume smuggler on the other hand, our objective is coverage: we want to screen as 
much traffic as possible to minimize this smuggler’s evasion probability. This is how we 
consider these different scenarios from here on in this article. We use the parameter λ to 
represent the weight of the objective of thwarting the evasive smuggler as opposed to the 
volume smuggler. Thus, in the above formulation, 
, ∗ , 1 ∗ ,  
where hE(x,ω) is the evasion probability of evasive smuggler ω given detector installation 
vector x, and hV(x, ω) is the evasion probability for a volume smuggler given detector 
installation vector x. These two functions are defined in Section 3.2 below. 
3.1.3. Probabilistic and adversarial smugglers 
Beyond evasive and volume smugglers, we consider smuggler behavior in terms 
of how smugglers might pick their targets. The first of these is the probabilistic smuggler. 
In this case we have one smuggler equally likely to be leaving any of the given origins 
and having an equal probability of picking any destination. Thus the number of threat 
scenarios is equal to the number of origin-destination pairs, and each threat scenario is 
equally likely. 
In the adversarial smuggler scenario, we again have a smuggler who is equally 
likely to be leaving any of the given origins, but instead of picking any destination with 
equal probability, the smuggler targets the destination which can be reached with the 
highest evasion probability from his chosen origin. The adversarial smuggler optimizes 
not only over routes, but also over destinations. Under these conditions, the number of 
threat scenarios is equal to the number of origins. In both cases, the smuggler is adaptive 
in that their optimal path depends on where we locate detectors. We note that while we 
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do use equally-weighted probabilities as described here in our analysis, the model that we 
use can also handle a probabilistic smuggler with unequal weights on origins and 
destinations and an adversarial smuggler with unequal weights on the origins.  
3.2. PARAMETERS 
The following parameters are considered in our model: 
 λ ∈  0,1  represents the weight of the evasive smuggler objective function. A 
higher value of λ indicates a greater emphasis on interdicting the evasive 
smuggler (that is, minimizing evasion probability for the evasive smuggler). 
Conversely, a lower value of λ puts emphasis on screening as much traffic volume 
as possible. Thus, the optimal solution for a value of λ = 0 is the list of ports of 
entry in descending order of volume. This parameter affects our strategy in 
installing detectors at POEs. 
 qk ∈  0,1  represents the evasion probability through a POE k, given that a 
detector is in place. That is, qk denotes the inefficiency of the detectors at k. We 
begin by assuming that the detectors are perfectly reliable (that they will sound an 
alarm 100% of the time if a smuggler tries to go through) but relax this 
assumption in our sensitivity analysis to see whether this affects solutions. These 
parameters affect the structure and evasion probabilities of the network. 
 Port of entry evasion probabilities for different modes: these parameters represent 
the intrinsic probability that a smuggler would not get caught at a POE in the 
absence of a detector. These values can vary depending on the type of POE. These 
parameters affect the structure and evasion probabilities of the network. 
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 Fixed rates on network arcs (α): These parameters impose a decrease in the 
evasion probability on arcs in the network relative to their length. We have a 
separate fixed rate parameter for each of the three network modes (αrail for rail, 
αroad for road and αsea for sea). These parameters affect the structure and evasion 
probabilities of the network.  
 
As noted above, fixed rate and border crossing evasion probability parameters 
affect the indigenous evasion probabilities that a smuggler faces. We use them, along 
with the qk parameters, to compute the evasion probabilities for the evasive and volume 
smugglers, hE(x, ω) and hV(x, ω).  
In the case of the evasive smuggler this is done as follows: For each smuggler ω 
and point of entry k we compute the value of the maximum-reliability path from 
smuggler ω’s origin to the entrance to k, say , , and the value of the maximum 
reliability path from the exit from k to the smuggler’s destination, say, , . These 
maximum reliability paths are computed as the products of the evasion probabilities of 
each of the arcs in the path. The evasion probability of an arc going from node i to node j 
is 
 
where dij is the length of the arc and α is the fixed rate that is determined by the mode of 
transportation on that arc; i.e., α = αrail or α = αroad or α = αsea. These pij values are used in 
computing the ,  and ,  terms by solving a maximum-reliability path problem, which, 
in turn, can be reduced through a logarithmic transformation to a shortest path problem. 
Note that the evasion probability of a path between any two nodes is computed as the 
product of the evasion probabilities on all the arcs traveled between the two nodes since 
we assume that these evasion events are independent. Thus we obtain the value of the 
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maximum reliability paths from origin to point of entry ,  and from point of entry to 
destination , . If we call the product of these two probabilities  = , , , then the 
evasion probability for an evasive smugger ω is given by 
,  max
∈
1 ,  
where  is the evasion probability through POE k if no detector is installed there, 
determined by its mode. 
 In the case of the volume smuggler, what we are concerned the probability that a 
smuggler passes through a POE that does not have a detector installed, given that the 
choice of where to enter the country depends on the proportion of the total volume 
coming through each POE. We assume that the volume smuggler can get from their 
origin to the border with an evasion probability of 1, and from the border to their 
destination with an evasion probability of 1, since the volume smuggler objective is 
simply a measure of how much traffic gets screened. Therefore, the evasion probability 
for volume smuggler ω is given by 
,   ∗
∈
max 1 ,  
where πk is the proportion of all volume that goes through POE k. 
In our analysis, we vary the qk, fixed rate and border crossing evasion probability 
parameters in an attempt to accurately model existing conditions, achieve realistic 
smuggler movement and test the robustness of the model and our assumptions. We also 
vary λ to observe the effects of the two competing objective functions on solutions.  
3.3. SOLVER 
Solutions to the model are computed by custom-made solver algorithms 
implemented by Michael V. Nehme (see Nehme [9]). The model is solved to optimality 
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for each budget value. Furthermore, a heuristic method is used to find nested solutions. 
We discuss in more detail the notion of nested solutions below. 
3.3.1. Optimal solver 
The model is solved as a stochastic network interdiction problem defined on top 
of a maximum-reliability path problem, where installing a detector at a POE is 
represented by changing the evasion probability on the arc through that POE. The model 
can be reformulated and solved as a stochastic mixed integer program. Pan and Morton 
[12], Nehme and Morton [11] and Dimitrov et al. [4] discuss the solver algorithm and 
computational enhancements in more detail. For every budget value b, the optimal solver 
returns the set of detector locations which minimize the smuggler’s evasion probability. 
3.3.2. Nested (heuristic) solver 
The optimal solution may not be practically applicable, because the set of secured 
POEs for different budget values can vary dramatically. For example, suppose there are 
20 land POEs a smuggler could choose from when coming into the U.S. from Mexico, 
and 30 when coming from Canada. In this scenario, the optimal solution for a budget of 
20 may be to secure the Mexican Border in its entirety, while a budget of 30 may have 
those detectors be of better use when placed on the Canadian border, leaving the Mexican 
border open. Obviously, this is not practically feasible since it does not make sense to 
move installed detectors. A more realistic policy is to build up and strengthen 
infrastructure over time. The heuristic solver works towards this goal. This solver builds 
a priority list of the order in which to improve detection capability at POEs. That is, the 
heuristic solver gives us nested solutions: the POEs that are secured for a budget value of 
b are also required to be used for all budget values greater than b. The particulars of 
obtaining such nested solutions are discussed in greater detail in Nehme and Morton [10]. 
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3.4. SOLUTION FORM 
Both the nested and optimal solvers determine the best placement of detectors 
along the border for each possible budget value b. The solvers return as output the 
locations of the detectors (i.e., the ports of entry k for which xk = 1), the evasion 
probability and coverage with these detectors in place, as well as the weighted objective 
function value for the particular arrangement, dependent on λ. In addition to this, we 
generate plots demonstrating the best locations for detectors and highlighting smuggler’s 
preferred routes for different budget values. 
It is important to note that when we report overall system evasion probabilities, 
we rescale these so that the evasion probability with no detectors in place equals 1. This 
means that we cannot directly compare the evasion probabilities or composite objective 
function values for scenarios wherein parameter values affect the indigenous evasion 
probability of the complete network, unless we reverse this scaling.  
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4. Data 
Obtaining useful and significant results from the above model requires substantial 
data. Of course, we need to know K (our set of potential detector locations), as well as 
potential smuggler origins and destinations. We also need to know the transportation 
network, with all of its connections and possible routes, to determine how a smuggler 
would travel between an origin and a destination. 
4.1. THE NETWORK 
The transportation networks used to model this problem come from the PATRIOT 
database of Los Alamos National Laboratory. The PATRIOT database defines a global 
transportation network across different modes. One of its main features lies in the given 
arc reliabilities, which lies in the given arc evasion probabilities. For our problem we 
crop the network to only include desired modes of transportation (rail, road and sea) and 
applicable geographic territories. Further, we institute a penalty on evasion probability 
for switching modes, representing the risk of the smuggler being caught by authorities at 
a railroad station or sea port when transferring to a different transportation network. 
4.2. ORIGINS AND DESTINATIONS 
Recognizing that the specific selection of origins and destinations may affect the 
solution, careful consideration went into choosing which cities to use in our analysis. 




We consider 12 origins in total. We have three origins in each of Mexico and 
Canada, spread across each country, to model threats from different potential locations. 
These are listed below. 
 San Luis Potosi, Mexico 
 Chihuahua, Mexico 
 Nuevo Casas Grandes, Mexico 
 Toronto, Canada 
 Winnipeg, Canada 
 Calgary, Canada 
 
While it is unlikely that nuclear materials of the type we are considering would in 
fact originate in Mexico or Canada, these origins were selected to account for scenarios 
in which a smuggler first successfully travels to North America and then attempts to enter 
the United States. A smuggler starting at any of these origins has at their disposal road 
and rail networks to try to get into the United States. The implicit assumption here is that 
if a smuggler decided to go to either Canada or Mexico en route to their destination, then 
they would not leave these countries except to get into the United States. 
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In addition to the origins listed above, we consider six origins spread across 
Europe, Africa and Asia. These selected origins represent the aggregated threat from 
outside of North America. They are: 
 Jakarta, Indonesia 
 Cirebon, Indonesia 
 Islamabad, Pakistan 
 Rotterdam, The Netherlands 
 Istanbul, Turkey 
 Cape Town, South Africa 
 
To get to the United States from any of these, a smuggler would have to travel by 
sea in our model. A smuggler originating in Asia has the ability to travel across the 
Pacific Ocean to any sea POE on the west coast of the United States, while a smuggler 
coming from Africa or Europe can cross the Atlantic to any U.S. sea POE on the east 
coast or in the Gulf of Mexico. 
By having an equal number of origins targeting each U.S. border, we try to 
eliminate the possibility that our solutions are distorted by an imbalance of threats 
coming from a certain direction. 
4.2.2. Destinations 
The destinations we consider are large cities in the United States, assuming that a 
smuggler’s target would be somewhere where they could cause significant damage. 
Destinations are spread across the country, although we do have a greater concentration 
of destinations in the east, representative of the population distribution in the United 
States. Below is a list of the 10 destinations. 
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 New York City, NY 
 Philadelphia, PA 
 Washington, D.C. 
 Atlanta, GA 
 Chicago, IL 
 St. Louis, MO 
 Houston, TX 
 Denver, CO 
 Los Angeles, CA 
 Seattle, WA 
4.3. PORTS OF ENTRY 
In choosing potential detector locations, we consider only commercial POEs. For 
volume measures we consider foreign container cargo and shipments processed by these 
POEs over the course of one calendar year. The total volume processed through the POEs 
is over 26 million containers. 
4.3.1. Rail 
Data on rail POEs were obtained from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics’ 
database on North American Border Crossing/Entry Data 2009 [14]. This was cross-
referenced with records on the U.S. Customs and Border Protection website [15]. We 
consider POEs into the contiguous 48 states. As noted above, we are only interested in 
commercial POEs. In the context of rail, these are POEs with at least one loaded or empty 
rail container going through over the course of the year in question. Our volume measure, 
used to model the volume smuggler, is Loaded Rail Containers. 
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The end result is a list of 29 POEs, seven on the Mexican border, 22 on the 
Canadian border. Combined, these rail POEs handle 5% of total foreign container traffic 
into the United States. 
 
Illustration 4.1: Rail ports of entry 
4.3.2. Road 
As for rail POEs, data on road POEs were obtained from the Bureau of 
Transportation Statistics’ database on North American Border Crossing/Entry Data 2009 
[14] and cross-referenced with records on the U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
website [15]. Again, we consider only commercial POEs into the contiguous 48 states. In 
the context of road, a commercial POE is one with at least one loaded/empty truck 
container going through during the calendar year. The volume measure used for road 
POEs is Loaded Truck Containers. 
Bureau of Transportation Statistics data for road POEs are aggregated in some 
cases, and we may see one port authority responsible for the administration of multiple 
POEs. In these instances, we treat the data as follows: Where data for multiple small 
POEs were aggregated, we distribute the reported volume evenly among the POEs; where 
data for multiple POEs in single a metropolitan area or very close proximity to one 
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another were aggregated, such as is the case in Laredo, TX and Detroit, MI, we treat all 
these border POEs as a single POE with the notion that upgrades to their detection 
capability would occur in unison. 
The end result is a list of 112 road POEs, 21 on the Mexican border and 91 on the 
Canadian border. Combined, these road POEs account for 25% of all foreign container 
traffic coming into the United States. 
 
Illustration 4.2: Road ports of entry 
4.3.3. Sea 
We only consider container ports as sea POEs into the United States. This allows 
us to use a common unit for comparing volumes through POEs on different transportation 
networks. The data on sea POEs were obtained from Zepol’s 2009 U.S. Containerized 
Import Ports Report [16], and again cross-referenced with the U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection website [15]. As with rail and road before, we consider POEs into the 
contiguous 48 states. Our volume measure in this case is twenty-foot equivalent units 
(TEUs), representing a 20ft container. 
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The end result is a list of 46 sea POEs, 11 on the west coast and 35 on the east 
coast and Gulf of Mexico. Combined, these sea POEs process 70% of all foreign 
container traffic coming into the United States. 
 
Illustration 4.3: Sea ports of entry 
We have a total of 187 ports of entry into the U.S. across all three transportation 




We consider the probabilistic and adversarial models separately. For each, we 
present a base case determined by the value of parameter λ, the characteristics of the 
optimal and nested solutions for this base case, as well as comparisons to results for 
different values of λ. 
5.1. PROBABILISTIC MODEL BASE CASE 
The base case represents the situation where we are foremost concerned with an 
intelligent, informed and adaptive adversary. Still, we put some weight on the volume 
base smuggler to represent a preference for improving detection capability at high 
volume ports when significant improvements for an evasive smuggler are not possible. 
The chosen value of λ offers a good compromise between the two competing objective 
functions. Specifically, we observe very little loss in evasion probability performance as 
compared to the purely evasive smuggler scenario, while simultaneously getting large 
gains in coverage (see Table 5.1). 
5.1.1. Parameter values 
The parameters for the base case are as follows: 
 λ = 0.8, meaning that the weight on the evasive smuggler objective is four times 
that for the volume smuggler. 
 qk = 0, meaning perfectly reliable detectors at all ports of entry. 
 Fixed rates on network arcs: αrail = 0.00033334; αroad = 0.00008; αsea = 0. The 
choice of these α parameters decreases evasion probabilities for road travel by a 
factor of 0.923 for 1000km traveled by road, and 0.717 for the same distance 
traveled by rail. 
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 Port of entry evasion probabilities for different modes: 0.85 for rail, 0.75 for road, 
0.65 for sea. These parameter values were chosen to describe what we deem to be 
differences in a smuggler’s evasion probability when going through a POE on a 
particular mode, in the absence of a detector. 
 
For the probabilistic model, in the absence of detectors at any of the POEs into the 
United States this base case yields the smuggler paths illustrated in Illustration 5.1. 
 
Illustration 5.1: No detectors installed (probabilistic model, b = 0). 
5.1.2. Optimal solution 
We now walk through the optimal solution as we parametrically increase the 
budget b for the base case described above. The first priority of the optimal solution is to 
secure high volume POEs on all borders. When b = 18, we have secured the 18 highest 
volume POEs (13 sea ports and five road POEs), which together account for 77.1% of all 
container traffic. Once this is done, we continue installing detectors at sea ports on the 
 21
east coast. At b = 23, some detectors are reallocated from the east coast to the west coast, 
thereby completely securing that border. Going on, we resume securing the east coast. 
In the optimal solution for b = 33, at which point we have enough budget to install 
detectors at all POEs on the Mexican border, we shift resources there. As the budget 
value b grows larger, we keep the detectors on the Mexican border and resume securing 
the east coast. We continue to do so until the budget is sufficient to secure all sea ports, 
thus neutralizing all threats from origins outside of North America. This occurs at b = 46. 
At this budget value, all detectors are moved to sea ports and the Mexican border is once 
again left unprotected (see Illustration 5.2 and Illustration 5.3). 
 
Illustration 5.2: After Mexican border has been secured, continue installing detectors at 
sea ports (optimal solution for probabilistic model, b = 45). 
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Illustration 5.3: Solution moves all detectors to secure sea ports, once again opening up 
Mexican border, as soon as budget is sufficient (optimal solution for probabilistic model, 
b = 46). 
Once all sea ports are secure, we continue by installing detectors at high volume 
POEs on the Mexican and Canadian borders. Next, detectors are installed along the 
Mexican border. This gradually forces smuggler traffic coming through Mexico to take 
roundabout routes to their destinations, which decreases their evasion probability. When 
b = 74, we have enough resources to secure all 46 sea ports and all 28 POEs on the 
Mexican border. All detectors on the Canadian border are moved down to the Mexican 
border, completely closing out smugglers from those origins. 
From here on, only the Canadian border is left to secure. We begin doing so by 
securing high volume POEs once more. Resources intermittently shift east and west of 
the Great Lakes so as to maximally affect and divert preferred smuggler paths, depending 
on the number of detectors available. At b = 134, all detectors are moved so as to secure 
the entire Canadian border west of the Great Lakes. This forces a smuggler originating in 
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the middle to western part of Canada to go all the way around the Great Lakes to cross 
the border, and then back west again so as to reach destinations in the west of the United 
States. In the process, smugglers travel farther by land, increasing their risk of getting 
caught by indigenous law enforcement. 
As the budget grows larger still, we continue east of the Great Lakes, installing 
detectors and pushing these paths to destinations in the west farther until a final 
reallocation occurs at b = 183. At this budget value, detectors from the western-most 
points on the Canadian border are reallocated so as to completely secure every POE east 
of the Great Lakes. This results in a greater decrease in the smuggler’s evasion 
probability since the trip required to circumvent secured detectors is longer. Securing all 
POEs east of the Great Lakes also has a greater effect on the objective function value due 
to the greater number of threat scenarios affected. This is due to the concentration of 
destinations in the east. 
 
Illustration 5.4: All borders secured (solution for probabilistic model, b = 187). 
 24
Finally, all borders are secured at b = 187 (see Illustration 5.4). We note that 
throughout, a smuggler prefers to travel by road rather than rail, unless their route brings 
them close to a rail POE, in which case they come into the United States by rail and 
immediately revert back to traveling by road. 
5.1.3. Nested solution 
The nested solution starts by securing POEs with the highest traffic. The seven 
POEs that process the highest volume of incoming containers top the priority list and are 
the first to have detectors installed. All of these are sea ports: three on the west coast (Los 
Angeles, CA, Long Beach, CA and Seattle, WA), one in the Gulf of Mexico (Houston, 
TX), and three on the east coast (New York, NY, Newark, NJ and Savannah, GA). 
Together, these account for 49.3% of all container traffic coming into the United States. 
We continue installing detectors at sea ports along the east coast, starting in the southeast 
with the high volume ports of Norfolk, VA, Charleston, SC, Miami, FL and Port 
Everglades, FL. Next we secure all remaining sea ports in New England, as well as the 
one in Chicago, IL. By doing so, we force any smuggler coming from across the Atlantic 
who targets cities on the east coast to travel farther within the United States, from their 
entry points in the southeast, to their destinations in the northeast. We continue installing 
detectors further down the east coast then into the Gulf of Mexico, forcing the smuggler 
on increasingly longer routes to these destinations. With each additional sea port secured, 
we see the smuggler’s preferred routes become longer. Once detectors are installed at all 
of the sea ports on the Eastern Seaboard and the Gulf of Mexico, the threat from across 
the Atlantic (represented by the origins in The Netherlands, Turkey and South Africa) is 
neutralized. The solution then dictates that we proceed to install detectors at all of the 
remaining unsecured sea ports on the west coast, starting in California and working up 
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the coast. Again, this makes the smuggler’s travel within the U.S. (where indigenous law 
enforcement presents a risk) incrementally longer, thereby decreasing their evasion 
probability. Finally, at a budget value of b = 46, all sea ports into the United States have 
detectors installed and there is no threat coming in by sea (that is, from outside of North 
America). 
The high prioritization of sea ports on the east coast is most likely due to the 
concentration of potential destinations there. Since the probability of a smuggler getting 
caught is much greater when traveling by land than by sea, a smuggler would prefer to 
come in to the country as close to their destinations as possible. By securing the sea ports 
nearest to the biggest cluster of destinations, we cause the most inconvenience to the 
smuggler, as evidenced by the drop in evasion probability (see Figure 5.1). By securing 
all sea ports first, we neutralize half of the threat scenarios (represented by non-North 
American origins) at a relatively low cost of b = 46. Furthermore, since sea ports process 
the majority of foreign cargo coming into the country (just over 70%), by securing them 
first we also do a good job of thwarting the volume smuggler. 
Once detectors have been installed at all sea ports, the solution dictates that we 
focus our attention on the Mexican border. The first five POEs to have detectors installed 
are the five highest volume POEs on the Mexican border: the road POEs at Laredo, TX, 
Otay Mesa, CA, El Paso, TX, Hidalgo, TX and Nogales, AZ. Together, these POEs 
account for 74.8% of all container traffic coming in through the Mexican border. By 
securing these POEs first, we seek to maximally impact the volume smuggler. Once these 
POEs have been secured, we proceed to install detectors along the rest of the border, first 
heading from Laredo, TX towards the west coast, thus forcing all smuggler traffic from 
Chihuahua and Nuevo Casas Grandes to travel farther to get into the U.S. Once this is 
done, we secure the remainder of the Mexican POEs, all of which are in Texas. For a 
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budget value of b = 74, all of these POEs have been secured and the threat from the south 
has been neutralized (see Illustration 5.5). 
 
Illustration 5.5: Mexican border and sea ports secured                                                       
(nested solution for probabilistic model, b = 74). 
After all sea ports have detectors installed, securing either the Mexican or 
Canadian border would neutralize half of the remaining threat. Since it takes less 
resources to secure the border with Mexico, these POEs are a higher priority. Simply put, 
we obtain more significant results by focusing on Mexico than if we were to start 
installing detectors along the border with Canada. Since the benefit of completely 
securing an enitre border is greater than diverting a smuggler from their preferred routes, 
we see that no resources are allocated to the Canadian border until the Mexican border is 
secure. 
Once the Mexican border is secure, all that remains is installing detectors along 
the United States border with Canada. As with Mexcio before, we start by securing the 
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highest volume POEs. In this case, the following 11 POEs are secured: rail and road 
POEs in Detroit, MI and Port Huron, MI, road POEs in Buffalo, NY, Champlain, NY, 
Blaine, WA, Alexandria Bay, NY and Pembina, ND, and the rail POE in International 
Falls, MN. Together, these POEs account for 73% of all container traffic coming into the 
United States from Canada by land. Next, focus is shifted to securing the 50 remaining 
POEs east of the Great Lakes, with the solution sporadically jumping west to secure a 
high volume POE. The majority of these 50 POEs are in Maine, and are very close to 
each other. Because of this, there is very little benefit to securing some of these POEs and 
not all, as an evasive sumggler would be able to enter the country through any adjacent 
unsecured POE with little impact on their evasion probability. It may seem 
counterintuitive that so much emphasis is placed on securing these POEs before securing 
the rest of the border, but their importance lies in their proximity to the destinations in the 
east of the United States. 
After detectors have been installed at the New England POEs, we proceed west 
from the Great Lakes, systematically securing POEs heading further west. Doing so 
forces all smuggler traffic to travel farther west through Canada to get into the United 




Illustration 5.6: Smuggler routes are forced west by securing ports of entry along the 
Canadian border (nested solution for probabilistic model, b = 183). 
As stated above, we decrease the smuggler’s evasion probability by making 
preferred routes increasingly longer, which poses greater risk of interdiction by 
indigenous law enforcement. Finally, at a budget value of b = 187, all POEs into the 
United States have detectors installed and the borders are secure. 
5.1.4. Comparing nested and optimal solutions 
The nested and optimal solutions are identical at pivotal budget values: the nested 
solution is the same as the optimal for a budget value b = 46, when all detectors are 
placed at sea ports completely blocking traffic from outside North America, and for         
b = 74, at which point the Mexican border is secured in addition to all sea ports (see 
Figure 5.1). In terms of performance, there is a relatively small difference between the 
nested and optimal solutions. The optimal solution offers 3.3% better evasion probability 
and 4.0% better coverage, on average. While there is a strong emphasis on securing the 
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highest volume POEs at first, the nested solution mostly improves the weighted objective 
function value by systematically securing POEs so as to decrease evasion probability as 
quickly as possible. The optimal solution, on the other hand, first seeks to achieve a better 
objective value by increasing coverage, and then reallocates resources when a large 
decrease in evasion probability can be achieved. The points at which this is possible are 
where the two solutions are identical. 
 
Figure 5.1: Difference in evasion probabilities and coverage between optimal and nested 
solutions (probabilistic model, λ = 0.8). 
The optimal solution’s erratic behavior is clearly visible in Figure 5.1. Note how, 
at b = 33 we see a major drop in evasion probability, coupled with a corresponding drop 
in coverage. This is the point where detectors are moved from sea ports to the Mexican 
border. For values of b below 33, resources are better allocated to securing sea ports, due 
to their high volume. This increase in coverage improves our composite objective 
function value, which takes into account both our goals in the forms of the evasive and 
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volume smugglers. However, when enough resources exist to secure Mexico and achieve 
a big drop in evasion probability, most of the detectors are shifted there. Up until this 
point, the values of the composite objective functions are very close, but for b = 33 the 
optimal solution’s objective value is 15% better than that for the nested, and continues to 
get better. For b = 36, the optimal solution outperforms the nested solution by 21%. Other 
than this though, the nested solution objective function value is always within 10% of the 
optimal and is only 3.9% worse on average. 
5.1.5 Changing λ 
As discussed in the model formulation (see Section 3.1), we can represent evasive 
and volume smugglers by two competing objective functions. Changing λ changes the 
importance of thwarting a volume smuggler versus the importance of thwarting an 
evasive smuggler. Therefore, by varying λ, we can examine the effects of different policy 
goals. It is important to find a suitable balance between these competing objectives, and 
to determine what effect changing the relative weight of each objective has on the priority 
ranking of POEs. Our base case has an interesting property, namely the grouping in the 
priority list of POEs in the same region. We see that all POEs on the Mexican border get 
secured in order, as do all east coast sea ports, and all Canadian POEs. We can think of 
this as geographic clustering. This is very important, because it demonstrates the 
existence of an overarching logic to the ranking in the priority list. That is, the exact order 
in which we secure POEs is not as important as the order in which we secure regions, as 
evidenced by the large drops in evasion probability at pivotal budget values. If 
geographic clustering is maintained across different values of λ, this would be indicative 
of good performance of our solution regardless of the nature of the threat we face. 
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5.1.5.1 Increasing λ 
By increasing λ, we put more influence on interdicting the evasive smuggler. We 
should see more sharply decreasing evasion probabilities, at the expense of coverage. 
In the case of λ = 1, the priority list changes somewhat, but changes in priority 
only occur among (and not across) sea ports, Mexican POEs, and Canadian POEs. For 
example, we see that now the high volume sea ports in Los Angeles, CA and Long 
Beach, CA are no longer at the very top of the priority list. Instead, this solution dictates 
that we secure the entire Eastern Seaboard and the Gulf of Mexico before installing 
detectors anywhere on the west coast, thereby achieving the benefit of neutralizing all 
threats coming via the Atlantic at a lower budget value. However, despite this difference 
and other similar ones on the Mexican and Canadian borders, the geographic clustering of 
the priority list, in terms of first securing sea ports, then the Mexican border, then the 
Canadian border, stays the same (see Figure 5.2). 
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Figure 5.2: Nested solutions for different values of λ (probabilistic model). 
5.1.5.2. Decreasing λ 
Lower values of λ denote more influence on thwarting the volume smuggler. We 
can expect coverage to go up in these scenarios, but this would correlate to higher 
evasion probabilities (see Figure 5.3). 
As the value of λ is decreased, the priority list tends more and more towards a 
volume ranking of POEs. We see that the priority list structure of first securing sea ports, 
then the Mexican border, then the Canadian border gradually falls apart as λ goes to 0. 
For example, note that for λ = 0.6, the solution dictates that we install detectors at the 
high volume road POEs in Detroit, MI, Laredo, TX, Buffalo, NY and Port Huron, MI 
before securing all sea ports. This type of change in the priority list becomes more and 
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more prevalent as we decrease λ until, at λ = 0, the priority list is simply a volume 
ranking of all POEs. 
 
Figure 5.3: Difference in evasion probabilities and coverage between nested solutions for 
probabilistic model, varying λ. 
At our base case of λ = 0.8 there is a good balance in terms of performance based 
on the two competing objective functions of minimizing evasion probability and 
maximizing coverage. For this value of λ, neither coverage nor evasion probability is 
much worse than when the cases when we focus on either of these objectives exclusively 
(λ = 1 for evasion probability; λ = 0 for coverage). 
 
  λ = 1 λ = 0.8 λ = 0.6 λ = 0.4 λ = 0.2 λ = 0 
Average Difference in 
Evasion Probability 
-1.1% 0% +3.4% +4.1% +12.8% +141.9%
Average Difference in 
Coverage 
-14.8% 0% +6.2% +7.2% +9.3% +10.6%
Table 5.1: Probabilistic model nested solution performance, varying λ. 
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5.2. ADVERSARIAL MODEL BASE CASE 
As with the probabilistic model above, the base case represents the situation 
where we are foremost concerned with an intelligent, informed and adaptive adversary, 
while still putting some weight on the volume-based smuggler to represent a preference 
for improving detection capability at high volume ports. Again, the chosen value of λ 
offers a good compromise between the two competing objective functions and we 
observe very little loss in evasion probability performance as compared to the purely 
evasive smuggler scenario, while simultaneously seeing big gains in coverage (see Table 
5.2). 
5.2.1. Parameter values 
The parameter values used in the base case for the adversarial model are the same 
as those used in the base case for the probabilistic model detailed in Section 5.2. The 
values for λ, qk, the fixed rates αrail, αroad and αsea, as well as the border crossing detection 
probabilities for the different modes are identical to the values specified in Section 5.1.1.  
For the adversarial model, in the absence of detectors at any of the POEs into the 
United States this base case yields the smuggler paths illustrated in Illustration 5.7. Note 
how a smuggler starting at each origin chooses to go to the destination closest to them. 
For example, a smuggler coming across the Atlantic chooses New York City, NY as their 
target destination, as the path to this destination has the highest evasion probability. 
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Illustration 5.7: No detectors installed (adversarial model, b = 0). 
5.2.2. Optimal solution 
As in the case of the probabilistic model analyzed in Section 5.1, we walk through 
the optimal solution as we parametrically increase the budget value b for the base case 
described above. The optimal solution starts by securing the POEs with the highest 
volume of traffic. This trend continues as b increases until b = 25 and detectors shift to 
the Texas-Mexico border. A smuggler originating in San Luis Potosi, Mexico then diverts 
from Houston, TX to Los Angeles, CA.  
Next, we proceed by adding detectors at high volume sea ports. When the budget 
value reaches b = 33, most of these detectors are reallocated to secure the Mexican 
border entirely, neutralizing the threat posed by a smuggler that originates in Mexico (see 
Illustration 5.8). For subsequent increases of b, we continue adding detectors at the 
highest volume POEs. When b = 52, this secures the east coast of the United States 
(excluding the Gulf of Mexico), and a smuggler coming from across the Atlantic now 
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prefers to target Houston, TX. As b continues to increase, we allocate detectors to high 
volume land POEs along the Canadian border. When b = 64, we reallocate detectors to 
the Gulf of Mexico because enough resources exist to secure all remaining ports there. 
By moving all detectors to the sea ports on the Gulf of Mexico, we neutralize threats 
coming from across the Atlantic. 
 
Illustration 5.8: Mexican border secured (optimal solution for adversarial model, b = 33). 
At b = 79, all the west coast sea ports are secure. For values of b up to 100, we 
place additional detectors at high volume POEs on the Canadian border. When b = 101, 
detectors previously installed east of the Great Lakes are reallocated to the west. This 
causes a smuggler originating in Calgary, Canada to reroute to Denver, CO instead of 
Seattle, WA. We continue to add detectors in this direction for values of b up to 125. 
Again, this lengthens the smuggler’s route and decreases their evasion probability. 
When b = 126, some detectors are moved from the west coast to the Canadian 
border. They are used to secure all POEs west of the Great Lakes. This forces a smuggler 
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originating in Calgary, Canada or Winnipeg, Canada to travel around the Great Lakes to 
enter the United States, lengthening their routes further. The preferred destination 
becomes New York City, NY. This change does, however, leave the west coast exposed 
once again. 
When b = 136, the west coast is secured, and for subsequent increases in b 
detectors are installed east of the Great Lakes. This continues until b = 152, at which 
point detectors from both the east and west coasts are reallocated to completely secure the 
Canadian border (see Illustration 5.9 and Illustration 5.10). 
 
Illustration 5.9: After Mexican border and all sea ports have been secured, continue 
installing detectors at sea ports (optimal solution for adversarial model, b = 151). 
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Illustration 5.10: Solution moves detectors from sea ports to ports of entry in Canada as 
soon as budget is sufficient to secure that border                                                             
(optimal solution for adversarial model, b = 152). 
From here increases in b gradually build up defenses on the east coast again, 
securing all POEs there when b = 180, and finally installing detectors at all remaining 
POEs on the west coast when b = 187. As in the case of the probabilistic scenario, we see 
that all smugglers prefer to travel by road. Smugglers switch to rail only to decrease route 
length if the alternative of using a road crossing increases distance and exposure to 
indigenous law enforcement. 
5.2.3. Nested solution 
The nested solution for the adversarial smuggler model places the two highest 
volume POEs (the sea ports at Los Angeles, CA and Long Beach, CA) at the top of the 
priority list, but then shifts focus to the Mexican border. Starting on the east coast of 
Texas, detectors are installed along the U.S. border with Mexico as b increases, gradually 
forcing a smuggler originating there to go farther west, and changing their preferred 
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destinations in the process. The first such change occurs at b = 16, where detectors along 
the Texas border with Mexico make Houston, TX and Denver, CO less desirable 
destinations for smugglers origination in San Luis Potosi, Mexico and Chihuahua, 
Mexico respectively. Smugglers originating here now choose instead to go to Los 
Angeles, CA. With further increases in b, detectors continue to be placed along this 
border until, at b = 33, the entire Mexican border has been secured, just as in the case of 
the optimal solution (see Illustration 5.8). 
As b increases from this point, detectors are placed at the highest volume land 
POEs on the Canadian border and along the east coast, eventually forcing a smuggler 
coming across the Atlantic out of New England and instead to Houston, TX when b = 53. 
We continue placing detectors along the east coast and the Gulf of Mexico for additional 
increases in b. When b = 70, all sea ports on the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico are 




Illustration 5.11: East coast seaports secured (nested solution for adversarial model,          
b = 70). 
Once this has been achieved, efforts are focused on the Canadian border. 
Detectors are installed here, starting at the west coast and moving east for larger values of 
b, gradually forcing a smuggler originating in Calgary, Canada to travel farther to reach 
their desired destination of Seattle, WA, until their preference changes to Denver, CO 
when b = 100. 
Detectors continue to be installed west of the Great Lakes for additional increases 
in b, incrementally diverting a smuggler originating in Calgary, Canada and Winnipeg, 
Canada. When b = 131, these smuggler prefers to target Chicago, IL. When b = 133 and 
all POEs west of the Great Lakes have been secured, any smuggler originating in Canada 
is forced to go along the border to POEs in Vermont, from where they proceed to their 
destination in New York City, NY. The addition of detectors further east along this 
border makes this trip ever longer (see Illustration 5.12). Thus, these smugglers’ evasion 
probability gradually decreases, until the entire Canadian border is secure when b = 181. 
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As b increases from this value, the remaining six detectors are installed at sea ports on the 
west coast, finally securing all borders. 
 
Illustration 5.12: Smugglers originating in Canada pushed east                                         
(nested solution for adversarial model, b = 162). 
5.2.4. Comparing nested and optimal solutions 
In the adversarial smuggler scenario, we see more significant differences between 
the optimal and nested solutions than we did in the probabilistic model analyzed in 
Section 5.1. The only (nontrivial) budget values for which the two solutions are identical 
are b = 33, at which point we secure the Mexican border, and b = 182, when only some 
west coast sea ports remain unsecured. The results returned by the optimal solver are 
more variable in this case than in the probabilistic smuggler scenario described in Section 
5.1; optimal detector installation sites change more as b increases. As a result, the nested 
solution performs relatively worse in this scenario than the probabilistic one. There is a 
larger gap between nested and optimal solutions for almost all budget values, and the 
 42
nested solution gives 12.3% worse evasion probability and 12.0% worse coverage, on 
average, than the optimal (see Figure 5.4). This difference is particularly great for budget 
values greater than 152, the point at which the optimal solution moves detectors away 
from sea ports to land POEs in New England, so as to secure the Canadian border. 
 
Figure 5.4: Difference in evasion probabilities and coverage between optimal and nested 
solutions (adversarial model, λ = 0.8). 
Figure 5.4 demonstrates the erratic nature of the optimal solution, with large 
changes in evasion probability correlating with even larger changes in coverage. The 
most pronounced of these is at b = 33, when many detectors shift from sea ports to the 
Mexican border. For values of b below 33, resources are better allocated to securing sea 
ports, due to their high volume. As with the probabilistic model, this increase in coverage 
improves our composite objective function value. When detectors are reallocated to 
Mexico we see an even bigger drop in evasion probability than we did in the probabilistic 
case.  
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The next big reallocation comes at b = 64, when the east coast and Gulf of 
Mexico are secured, thereby neutralizing the threat coming from across the Atlantic. Still, 
this change does not affect the objective function value of the optimal solution very 
much. In fact, for values of b under 151, the optimal solution objective value is never 
more than 10% better than that of the nested solution. For b = 152 however, the 
reallocation of detectors from sea ports to the Canadian border results in a massive drop 
in evasion probability, at the expense of a smaller change in coverage. At this point, the 
optimal solution objective function value is 50% better than the nested solution objective 
value. The benefit to our composite objective function of decreasing evasion probability 
is significantly greater than that of maintaining increased coverage. This gap in objective 
function values continues to grow as the optimal solution reaps the rewards of once again 
securing high volume sea ports, with the optimal solution ultimately being 92% better 
than the nested solution for b = 181. On average, the optimal solution for the adversarial 
model performs 12.5% better than the nested, a much greater gap than we see in the 
probabilistic case. 
5.2.5 Changing λ 
Similar to the analysis performed in the probabilistic case (see Section 5.1.5), we 
vary λ to examine the effects of different policy goals on the adversarial smuggler 
scenario, shifting emphasis between thwarting the volume or evasive smuggler. Again, it 
is important to find a suitable balance between these competing objectives, and to 
determine what effect changing the relative weight of each objective has on the priority 
ranking of POEs. As before, if our sensitivity analysis reveals minimal variation in the 
priority ranking across different values of λ, this would improve our confidence in the 
performance of our solution regardless of the nature of the threat we face. 
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Figure 5.5: Nested solution for different values of λ (adversarial model). 
5.2.5.1 Increasing λ 
As we discuss in Section 5.1.5.1, higher values of λ give more weight to 
interdicting the evasive smuggler. When doing so, we should see evasion probabilities 
decreasing more sharply as our budget b increases, at the expense of coverage. 
Unlike in the probabilistic smuggler scenario, drastic changes are observed when 
varying λ for the adversarial case (see Figure 5.5). For λ = 1, Mexico remains a top 
priority due to the proximity of potential destinations to origins in Mexico. After that 
though, only sea ports in the northeast are secured, so as to force a smuggler coming from 
across the Atlantic to travel further to their preferred destinations. Other sea ports, higher 
in priority if we put any weight on the coverage objective, fall to the bottom of the 
priority list. The adversarial model solutions do not have the clear geographic clustering 
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of those for the probabilistic model: the solution sporadically jumps to installing detectors 
at a sea port in between securing the Mexican and Canadian borders. 
5.2.5.2. Decreasing λ 
A smaller λ denotes increased weight on thwarting the volume smuggler. As for 
the probabilistic scenario, we can expect coverage to go up at the expense of evasion 
probabilities (see Figure 5.6). 
The changes in the priority list we see when decreasing λ for the adversarial 
model are very similar to those discussed in Section 5.1.5.2. Ports of entry on the 
Mexican border gradually slide down the priority list, replaced by high volume sea ports. 
Unlike in the case of the probabilistic smuggler model though, sea ports as a group never 
climb to the top of the priority list. The bulk always remain below Mexican POEs, with 
some on the southwest staying at the bottom of the priority list for all values of λ > 0. 
Ultimately, at λ = 0, the priority list is once again a volume ranking of all POEs. 
 
Figure 5.6: Difference in evasion probabilities and coverage between nested solutions for 
adversarial model, varying λ. 
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In the adversarial model the differences in performance against the volume 
smuggler and evasive smuggler are greater for varying values of λ. Whatever geographic 
clustering is present in this case is far less robust than in the probabilistic case, with POEs 
from different regions moving up and down on the priority list more for small changes in 
λ. Our base case with λ = 0.8, which still represents a reasonable compromise in attention 
paid to the two objectives, performs comparatively worse against both the optimal 
strategy for thwarting the evasive smuggler (λ = 1) and the optimal strategy for thwarting 
the volume smuggler (λ = 0) than the corresponding strategy in the probabilistic case (see 
Table 5.2). 
 
  λ = 1 λ = 0.8 λ = 0.6 λ = 0.4 λ = 0.2 λ = 0 
Average Difference in 
Evasion Probability 
-7.0% 0% +4.5% +6.6% +22.0% +177.7%
Average Difference in 
Coverage 
-30.1% 0% +16.8% +18.9% +20.5% +21.8%
Table 5.2: Adversarial model nested solution performance, varying λ. 
5.3. COMPARING PROBABILISTIC AND ADVERSARIAL MODELS 
The two sets of results presented above represent the effectiveness of their 
respective prioritizations in the context of the assumptions about the characteristics of the 
smuggler (probabilistic or adversarial). Therefore, the graphs demonstrating decreases in 
evasion probabilities cannot be compared one to one. The solutions given by neither 
scenario are absolutely “better” than the solutions given by the other. They are only better 
if smuggler threats act in the prescribed manner. Thus, we have two competing 
approaches, for two different assumptions. The remainder of this article focuses on the 
probabilistic model. This model is less susceptible to changes in origin, and can therefore 
better approximate the real-world threat with a limited list of origins. Since the 
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adversarial smuggler model solutions are strongly affected by our choice of origins, it is 
better suited to a scenario where we know of a specific threat and are looking to respond 
to that threat. In other words, the probabilistic model is applicable in a passive setting, 
while the adversarial model is more appropriate in an active setting, for example, the 
emergency deployment of resources in the face of a known threat. 
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6. Sensitivity analysis 
Apart from λ, the parameters described in Section 3.2 all influence the indigenous 
evasion probabilities in the network. This being the case, it is possible that the values we 
select for these parameters affect the outcomes of our solutions. This is undesirable, as 
we would like that the solutions we recommend to be robust to modest changes in these 
parameters. Below we perform sensitivity analyses on these parameters to determine 
whether this is the case. 
6.1. CHANGING DETECTOR RELIABILITY 
In the base case we assume that detectors are perfectly reliable. That is, any 
threatening amount of nuclear material will set off the detectors and that smuggler would 
be caught. However, this assumption is not realistic. A smuggler can use various means 
to decrease the risk of setting off the detectors, e.g., shielding the nuclear material in a 
lead enclosure. Increasing the value of the parameters qk accounts for this. In our 
sensitivity analysis, we vary qk uniformly across all ports of entry k. 
6.1.1. Increasing qk 
Increasing qk decreases the detection probability with a detector in place at port of 
entry k to 1 – qk. We observe almost no changes in the nested solution priority list (see 
Figure 6.1). Specifically, the priority list structure of securing sea ports first, then the U.S. 
border with Mexico, and finally that with Canada, remains unchanged for all of the 
values of q considered. This is a positive result, as it indicates that our priority list for 
securing POEs does not depend on the detectors’ reliability, at least up to a reasonable 
point. However, it is important to note that despite this consistency in the priority list, the 
overall evasion probability grows because there is still a chance that smugglers can go 
through a secured POE undetected. 
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Figure 6.1: Nested solution for different values of q. 
6.2. CHANGING BORDER CROSSING EVASION PROBABILITIES 
In our model, border crossing evasion probabilities represent the evasion 
probability that a smuggler faces when entering the United States at a POE with no 
detector installed. In our base case, these are different for the different modes of 
transportation. As discussed in Section 4.1, we use the network topology from the LANL 
PATRIOT database in calculating evasion probabilities. In our analysis, most network 
arcs have an evasion probability greater than 0.99, while border crossings have a lower 
evasion probability, accounting for the special attention paid by customs and border 
patrol officers at these locations. We assign different evasion probabilities to the different 
modes of transportation to represent what we perceive to be the extent and diligence of 
inspections at POEs of each mode. As stated in Section 5.1.1 and Section 5.2.1, in our 
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base cases the border crossing evasion probabilities for the different modes of 
transportation are as follows: 0.65 for sea, 0.75 for land, and 0.85 for rail. These 
parameter values were chosen to represent our belief that, in the absence of detectors, a 
smuggler has the greatest chance of being caught entering the country by sea and is least 
likely to be caught if they come by rail, with land being somewhere between the two. 
However, realizing that these assumptions may have an undue influence on our solutions, 
we perform sensitivity analysis on these parameters to see what effect, if any, their values 
have on the nested solution priority list. 
6.2.1. Less differentiation 
The first alternative we examine preserves the belief that indigenous evasion 
probabilities are different for different transportation modes, but with less differentiation. 
We test how the solution changes if border crossing reliabilities are set to 0.7 for sea, 
0.75 for road, and 0.8 for rail. The priority list for this case does not change significantly 
from the base case (see Figure 6.2). Sea ports remain the top priority, and the order in 
which to secure them does not change at all. And as before, the Mexican border comes 
next, and the Canadian border last. Within these groups, rail crossings fall in priority 
somewhat, a predictable result given that a smuggler’s evasion probability when going 
through a rail POE is now lower than in the base case. Importantly though, having less 
differentiation between border crossing reliabilities does not impact the geographic 
clustering in our solution. 
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Figure 6.2: Nested solution for different border crossing reliabilities across modes of 
transportation. 
6.2.2. All equal 
We also examine what would happen to our priority ranking of POEs in the event 
that there is no difference in evasion probabilities for different modes. In the smuggler’s 
eyes, this makes sea ports an even more attractive alternative than before and, as we 
would assume, they remain at the top of the priority list (see Figure 6.2). Meanwhile, rail 
POEs are now even less attractive to a smuggler. Correspondingly, we see some rail 
POEs slide further down priority list. Again though, the structure of the priority list 
remains unchanged from the base case, with sea ports being a top priority, then the 
Mexican border, and finally Canada. This stability is reassuring, as it indicates that our 
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solution is not excessively sensitive to assumptions we make regarding indigenous 
detection probabilities at border crossings. 
6.2.3. Decreasing sea port priority 
The persistent high ranking of sea ports on the priority list under various 
assumptions begs a question: under what conditions would sea ports no longer be our first 
concern? Since there is no real chance of a smuggler getting caught during the actual trip 
by sea, it seems that decreasing the evasion probability on sea arcs makes little sense. 
What we could change, however, is the evasion probability at sea POEs. We want to find 
out how low the evasion probability of entering the United States by sea has to be so that 
sea ports are no longer the top priority. Another way of thinking about this is that we 
want to find out how good indigenous law enforcement at sea ports has to be to make 
installing detectors somewhere else a better use of resources. 
To this end, we run the model varying the border crossing evasion probability for 
sea POEs (see Figure 6.3). We see that sea ports remain at the top of the priority list for 
sea border crossing evasion probability values as low as 0.525. Sea ports only fall below 
the Mexican border in the ranking when this value decreases to 0.5. Even then, some sea 
ports remain at the top of the priority list, due to the high volume of cargo they handle. 
What this reveals is that indigenous law enforcement at sea ports would have to be good 
enough to catch attempts to smuggle nuclear material with a probability of around 1/2 for 
sea ports to not be the first place where we install detectors. 
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Figure 6.3: Nested solution for different sea border crossing reliabilities. 
6.3. CHANGING FIXED RATES 
The final set of parameters which we use to modify the intrinsic characteristics of 
the network is the fixed rate penalties on arcs. As discussed in Section 3.2, these fixed 
rates are to account for the fact that, on certain modes of transportation, a smuggler’s 
probability of getting caught is impacted by the length of his trip. For example, the longer 
a smuggler drives on a highway, the more likely they are to get stopped and caught by 
indigenous law enforcement, simply due to increased exposure. We initially consider 
these in our model to address and fix illogical smuggler behavior. In our base case, the 
fixed rates for travel on different network modes are as follows: αsea = 0, αroad = 0.00008 
and αrail = 0.00033334. Below we discuss the effects of changing these fixed rates. 
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6.3.1. Decreasing fixed rate for rail 
First, we consider how our priority list might change if the fixed rate for rail is in 
fact lower than what we assume. To do so, we set αrail (the fixed rate for rail travel) to 
0.000165, about half of the initial value, while holding everything else constant. This 
makes rail a relatively more attractive mode of transportation. For example, traveling the 
1500km from Chihuahua, Mexico to Los Angeles, CA by rail now decreases evasion 
probability by a factor of 0.781 as opposed to the 0.607 we would see with the original 
value of αrail. Rail is now preferred to road for crossing the border in some cases, but road 
remains the more desirable mode of transportation otherwise. Predictably, some rail 
POEs rise higher in the priority list, but not to the extent that they change the geographic 
clustering of the priority list (see Figure 6.4). 
 
Figure 6.4: Nested solution for different arc fixed rates across modes of transportation. 
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6.3.2. Increasing fixed rate for road 
We also examine the effect of increasing αroad, the fixed rate penalty on road 
travel. This parameter value is doubled, to 0.00016. The effect of this change is to make 
travel by road relatively less attractive to a smuggler. The 2500km trip by road from 
Winnipeg, Canada to destinations on the east coast now has a penalty factor of 0.670 on 
evasion probability, as opposed to 0.819 with the original value of αroad. Again, rail is 
now preferred to road for crossing the border in some cases, but road remains the 
transportation mode of choice everywhere other than at the border. We observe some 




The goal of this article is to analyze smuggler movements along multiple 
transportation networks and paths into the United States to determine the best port of 
entry locations at which to deploy nuclear detectors. The optimal solutions of the network 
interdiction model provide insight into this problem, while the nested solutions give an 
implementable ranked priority list of detector locations. Various models of smuggler 
behavior are presented and analyzed, along with analysis of solution sensitivity to 
parameter values. Some important takeaways are presented below. 
7.1. WHAT THE MODEL REVEALS 
Our analysis reveals that the optimal placement of detectors given depends on the 
particular model of smuggler behavior used. Results in the probabilistic smuggler 
scenario are significantly different to those for the adversarial smuggler. This shows us 
that there is no one foolproof solution to the practical problem of securing the United 
States’ borders and that the choice of strategy is contingent on our beliefs as to how a 
smuggler acts. This should not be discouraging though, as the different approaches can be 
reconciled to good effect (for example, the competing objectives of thwarting the evasive 
and volume smugglers). The priority list generated by the base case probabilistic model 
provides a logical, sensible approach to securing our borders. 
One very real and practical insight garnered from analyzing the problem is that 
there are significant steps that can be taken to secure ports of entry into the country 
without even installing detectors. Specifically, the vulnerability of the Canadian border 
could be greatly reduced by simply closing or consolidating some ports of entry. In the 
case of Maine, for example, we have 23 commercial road ports of entry, many of which 
see minimal traffic and are in very close proximity to each other. Shutting down some or 
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all of these very low volume ports of entry would decrease the number of potential 
smuggler routes into the country, and barely affect freight traffic. 
7.2. SUMMARY OF EFFECTS OF VARYING PARAMETERS 
The sensitivity analyses performed in this article reveal that the effects of varying 
parameter values (other than λ) are negligible. When we vary q, border crossing 
reliabilities and fixed rates, the priority list of ports of entry does not change in a 
significant way. The values assigned to these parameters, specifically in the base case, 
represent assumptions that we make with regards to the network that a smuggler travels 
on. Thus, this stability is reassuring, in terms of the robustness of the given solutions, as it 
indicates that even if our assumptions are not entirely correct, this should not invalidate 
our results. 
7.3. FURTHER RESEARCH AND MODEL AMENDMENTS 
While this article strives to present a comprehensive model and interdiction 
strategy, there are further areas of interest that can, and should, be explored in the future. 
For one, we currently only consider commercial ports of entry, assuming that a smuggler 
would make use of commercial routes in their attempts to get nuclear materials into the 
U.S. Expanding this to include all ports of entry, and even illegal paths into the country, 
would lead to greater insights and a more complete picture of the real problem faced by 
the interdictor. 
The model could also be expanded to analyze scenarios where there is more than 
one line of defense (i.e., detectors can be installed in places other than U.S. ports of 
entry). This is discussed in Morton et al. [8] and Pan and Morton [12], but extensive 
analysis of these models has not been performed as yet. 
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Perhaps most significantly though, in its current conception, our model has one 
very unrealistic assumption: the budget value b represents the number of sites that can 
have detectors installed, not taking into account the actual cost of doing so. That is, we 
consider the cost of securing a large sea port such as the one in Los Angeles, CA to be 
equivalent to that of installing a detector at the single lane road port of entry in 
Monticello, ME. Obviously, this is not actually the case. Factoring in the monetary cost 
of securing different ports of entry could have a serious impact on our solutions, given 
the limited resources faced by the interdictor, and is something that should be considered 




All of the ports of entry into the United States used in our analysis are presented 
below, grouped by mode. 
RAIL PORTS OF ENTRY 
Mexican border  
1. Brownsville, TX 
2. Laredo, TX 
3. Eagle Pass, TX 
4. El Paso, TX 
5. Nogales, AZ 
6. Calexico East, CA 
7. Otay Mesa/San Ysidro, CA  
Canadian border 
8. Calais, ME 
9. Vanceboro, ME  
10. Van Buren, ME 
11. Jackman, ME 
12. Norton, VT 
13. Richford, VT 
14. Highgate Springs, VT 
15. Champlain/Rouses Pt., NY 
16. Trout River/Fort Covington/Chateaugay, NY  
17. Buffalo/Niagara Falls, NY 
18. Port Huron, MI 
19. Detroit, MI 
20. Sault Ste. Marie, MI 
21. International Falls, MN 
22. Pembina, ND 
23. Portal, ND 
24. Sweetgrass, MT 
25. Eastport, ID 
26. Boundary, WA 
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27. Laurier, WA 
28. Sumas, WA  
29. Blaine, WA 
ROAD PORTS OF ENTRY 
Mexican border 
1. Brownsville, TX (2 crossings) 
2. Progreso, TX 
3. Hidalgo/Pharr, TX 
4. Rio Grande City. TX 
5. Roma, TX 
6. Laredo, TX (2 crossings) 
7. Eagle Pass, TX 
8. Del Rio, TX 
9. Presidio, TX 
10. El Paso, TX (2 crossings) 
11. Santa Teresa, NM  
12. Columbus, NM 
13. Douglas, AZ 
14. Naco, AZ 
15. Nogales. AZ 
16. Sasabe, AZ 
17. San Luis, AZ (2 crossings) 
18. Andrade, CA 
19. Calexico East, CA 
20. Tecate, CA 
21. Otay Mesa, CA 
Canadian border 
22. Lubec, ME 
23. Calais, ME 
24. Vanceboro, ME 
25. Forest City, ME 
26. Orient, ME 
27. Houlton, ME 
28. Monticello, ME 
29. Bridgewater, ME 
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30. Easton, ME 
31. Hamlin, ME 
32. Fort Fairfield, ME 
33. Limestone, ME 
34. Van Buren, ME 
35. Madawaska, ME 
36. Fort Kent, ME 
37. Estcourt Station, ME 
38. Saint Pamphile, ME 
39. Saint Juste, ME 
40. Somerset County, ME (2 crossings) 
41. Jackman, ME 
42. Coburn Gore, ME 
43. Pittsburg, NH 
44. Beecher Falls, VT 
45. Canaan, VT 
46. Norton, VT 
47. Derby Line, VT 
48. Richford, VT (3 crossings) 
49. Morses Line, VT 
50. Highgate Springs, VT 
51. Champlain/Rouses Pt., NY (3 crossings) 
52. Mooers, NY 
53. Cannon Corners, NY 
54. Churrubusco/Clinton, NY 
55. Chateaugay, NY 
56. Jamieson Line, NY 
57. Trout River, NY 
58. Fort Covington, NY 
59. Massena, NY 
60. Ogdensburg, NY 
61. Alexandria Bay/Cape Vincent, NY 
62. Buffalo/Niagara Falls, NY (2 crossings) 
63. Port Huron, MI 
64. Detroit, MI (2 crossings) 
65. Sault Ste. Marie, MI 
66. Grand Portage, MN 
67. International Falls, MN 
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68. Baudette, MN 
69. Warroad, MN 
70. Roseau, MN  
71. Pinecreek, MN 
72. Lancaster, MN 
73. Pembina, ND 
74. Neche, ND  
75. Walhalla, ND 
76. Maida, ND 
77. Hannah, ND  
78. Sarles, ND 
79. Hansboro, ND  
80. St. John, ND  
81. Dunseith, ND 
82. Carbury, ND  
83. Westhope, ND  
84. Antler, ND 
85. Sherwood, ND 
86. Northgate, ND 
87. Portal, ND 
88. Noonan, ND  
89. Ambrose, ND 
90. Fortuna, ND 
91. Raymond, MT 
92. Whitetail, MT  
93. Scobey, MT 
94. Opheim, MT 
95. Morgan, MT 
96. Turner, MT  
97. Wildhorse, MT 
98. Whitlash, MT 
99. Sweetgrass, MT 
100. Del Bonita, MT 
101. Piegan, MT (2 crossings) 
102. Roosville, MT 
103. Eastport, ID 
104. Porthill, ID 
105. Metaline Falls, WA 
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106. Boundary, WA 
107. Frontier, WA 
108. Laurier, WA 
109. Oroville, WA 
110. Sumas, WA 
111. Lynden, WA 
112. Blaine, WA 
SEA PORTS OF ENTRY 
East coast 
1. Chicago, IL 
2. Portsmouth, NH 
3. Boston, MA 
4. New York, NY 
5. Newark, NJ 
6. Philadelphia, PA 
7. Chester, PA 
8. Wilmington, DE 
9. Baltimore, MD 
10. Richmond/Petersburg, VA 
11. Newport News, VA 
12. Norfolk, VA 
13. Wilmington, NC 
14. Charleston, SC 
15. Savannah, GA 
16. Fernandina Beach, FL 
17. Jacksonville, FL 
18. Fort Pierce, FL 
19. West Palm Beach, FL 
20. Port Everglades, FL 
21. Miami, FL 
Gulf of Mexico  
22. Port Manatee, FL 
23. Tampa, FL 
24. Panama City, FL 
25. Mobile, AL 
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26. Gulfport, MS 
27. New Orleans, LA 
28. Gramercy, LA 
29. Lake Charles, LA 
30. Beaumont, TX 
31. Galveston, TX 
32. Houston, TX 
33. Freeport, TX 
34. Corpus Christi, TX 
West coast 
35. Port Townsend, WA 
36. Everett, WA 
37. Seattle, WA 
38. Tacoma, WA 
39. Longview, WA 
40. Vancouver, WA 
41. Portland, OR 
42. Oakland, CA 
43. Port Hueneme, CA 
44. Long Beach, CA 
45. Los Angeles, CA 
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